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BREAKING THE LIMIT-LIABILITY FOR
WILFUL MISCONDUCT UNDER THE
GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
WILLIAM J. HICKEY JR.
F ROM THE time the limits of liability for passenger recovery,
as established in Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention,'
became outdated as a realistic and adequate amount of compen-
sation for injuries and death, no acceptable plan has been found
that complies with the competing interests of uniformity and ade-
quacy of compensation. The large majority of nations desire a
system whereby the amount of liability the carrier may incur will be
set at levels which will make it economically feasible for them to
participate and develop in international passenger carriage. On the
other hand, the United States has maintained it will not accept a
policy that limits liability if passengers cannot adequately be com-
pensated in terms of damage awards obtained against its domestic
airlines. Since revision of the limits of liability of the Warsaw Con-
vention was first considered in 1955,' no satisfactory solution from
the United States standpoint has been achieved. The adoption of
the Montreal Interim Agreement3 in 1967 can be seen as an en-
during consequence of this stalemate.
* A.B., Notre Dame; J.D., University of Toledo School of Law; LL.M., Uni-
versity of London; Received diploma, Air and Space Law, London Institute of
World Affairs; Member: American Bar Association, Maryland Bar Association
and Montgomery County Bar Association. Upon his return to the United States,
Mr. Hickey will be engaged in private legal practice in Montgomery County,
Maryland.
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, open for signature December 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
'International Conference on Private Air Law, Hague, 1955.
'Adopted May 19, 1966, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1521, T.I.A.S. No. 6108. Stipulation
whereby carriers operating to U.S. agreed to passenger compensation awards
under absolute liability to the amount of $75,000 for flights originating, stopping
and ending in the U.S.
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The Guatemala City Protocol was concluded upon the belief
that it would be acceptable to the United States and once again
establish the desired uniformity in international air travel that
was enjoyed so long under the Warsaw Convention." Article 35A
of the Guatemala Protocol was specifically included so that states
like the United States could supplement the plaintiff's damage
award.
Support for the Protocol within the United States has come
chiefly from the American representative of IATA, the State De-
partment, the Department of Transportation, and the present ad-
ministration." Strong opposition has been registered from the bar
associations as well as the American Trial Lawyers Association.!
In addition, resistance will undoubtedly come from the manufactu-
rers of aircraft frames, engines, and component parts, as well as
from any other sector of the aircraft industry that might be dis-
criminated against because of the carriers' shielded liability posi-
tion. Since the Senate's deliberations will undoubtedly attract public
scrutiny, public opinion will play a most important role. One of
the most significant aspects of the Protocol, therefore, is the elim-
ination of any sanction for injury occasioned by a carrier's wilful
misconduct. The carrier under this protocol will be absolutely liable
to a set limit under any circumstances except for the defense of
contributory negligence.
4 The Warsaw Convention was the only treaty governing international air
travel from 1929 until the adoption of the Hague Protocol to amend the Warsaw
Convention, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol].
, Provision permitting a state to establish within its territory a system to sup-
plement the compensation payable under the Convention. The U.S. believed in
light of statistics of domestic air accident awards between 1968 and 1970, a
$100,000 limit would be insufficient to compensate adequately its accident vic-
tims. See Protocol to Amend the [Warsaw Convention] signed at Guatemala City
on March 8, 1971.
' International Air Transportation Association. ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971)
[hereinafter Guatemala Protocol].
'McCoy, Yes or No to Guatemala Protocol-Con. 10 FORUM 739, 761
(1975).
8Id. Kreindler, Guatemala Patch-up, I AIR LAW 25 (1975); Kreindler, Sym-
posium, Guatemala Protocol, 6 AKRON L. REv. 131 (1973). Kennelly, A Novel
Rule of Liability: Its Implications, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 343 (1970). Kennelly,
International Symposium Concerning the Warsaw Convention, 75 ROYAL AERO-
NAUTICAL JOURNAL 83, 99 (1971).
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A. TAKING WILFUL MISCONDUCT OUT OF THE CONVENTION
1. Wilful Misconduct Considered
The question of replacing Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention!
was a much debated topic at the Hague Conference on Private Air
Law in September 1955." Most of the discussion concerned the
confusion existing among nations as to the precise meaning of
"wilful misconduct" in terms of domestic law. The meaning of the
phrase faute lourde et de dol as referred to in the original French
draft of Article 25,11 did not yield to a clear English equivalent. It
was decided that "wilful misconduct" should be defined specifically
in the article, and this change is reflected in Article 25 of the War-
saw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol."
When the Article was first considered, it was proposed that any
change in Article 25 should be made in conjunction with the ques-
tion of increasing the limits under Article 22" in order that situa-
tions where the limits could be exceeded would be specifically
'Article 25 (1):
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of this Schedule which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage
is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part
as, in accordance with the law of the court seised of the case, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
'0 ICAO Legal Committee, Report on Revision of the Warsaw Convention,
International Conference on Private Air Law, Hague, 1955, ICAO Doc. No.
7686-LC/140.
11 R. HORNER, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTI-
CAL LAW MINUTES, WARSAW, 1929, 212 (1975). President of the Committee (Gi-
annini): "We have succeeded in finding this formula, . .. by which we have
succeeded in adopting the expression 'faute lourde et de dol,' an expression diffi-
cult to translate into English." The original French text reads in part " . . . si le
dommage provient de son dol ou d'une faute qui, d'apres la loi du tribunal said,
est considre comme equivalent au dol."
12 Article 13 of the Hague Protocol reads:
The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it
is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the
carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage
or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result; provided that, in the case of such act or omission of a servant
or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the scope of
his employment.
Hague Protocol, supra note 4, at 383.
"3 The purpose for the International Conference at the Hague was to discuss
changes to the Warsaw Convention and one change urged by many delegates
was to increase the $8,300 limit for passenger compensation which they consid-
ered low compared to the standard of living of the 1950's. See also ICAO Legal
Committee, supra note 10, Vol. II Report of Rio Conference.
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enumerated in Article 25. The Australian delegate then suggested
that a system of strict liability without defense should replace Arti-
cle 25 altogether. He noted, however, that the proposal would pro-
bably receive little support." In reply, it was pointed out that the
suggestion failed to take into account the purpose for which Article
25 was inserted into the 1929 Warsaw Convention: to insure that
the Convention did not offend the public policy of states that would
be offended by provisions which protected persons guilty of crim-
inal or unlawful acts.1" Hubiert Drion of the Netherlands, in pro-
posing specific language for a new Article 25, submitted that the
concept of wilful misconduct should also embrace acts committed
"with full realization of the reckless character of his or their con-
duct and of the danger that damages would result."'"
2. Fault to Absolute Liability
Anglo-American tort law developed primarily on the principle
that fault should be the basis for shifting loss from an injured
party to the party whose conduct caused the injury." The early
common law decisions consistently took cognizance of whether
particular behavior was blameworthy." In 1868, Rylands v. Fletch-
er"" introduced the principle of strict liability into tort law when
the actor was made liable, irrespective of fault, for injury-producing
conduct simply upon the basis of the inherently dangerous nature
of the activity. The advent of socially interdependent societies
prompted the suggestion that the main impetus in accident law
should be to promote the well-being of accident victims regardless
of fault if this could be achieved without imposing too great a so-
"ICAO Legal Committee, Minutes 8th Sess., supra note 10, at 98.
15 Certain instances of gross negligence, professional negligence, reckless driv-
ing or behavior are sometimes used interchangeably with the term criminal negli-
gence where the conduct involved amounts to involuntary manslaughter as de-
fined by the criminal codes. See also ICAO Legal Committee, Minutes 14th Sess.,
supra note 10, at 170.
"Id. at 198.
"Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REV. 401, 402
(1958-59). Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L.
REv. 315, 444 (1894). 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 446, 447 (5th
ed. 1942).
1" Keeton, supra note 17, at 404. See also Orr, Fault as the Basis of Liability,
21 J. AIR L. & COM. 399, 402 (1954).
1L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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cial cost.2" "Deep pocket," "better risk bearer," "enterprise liabil-
ity," and "allocation of resources" have been some of the theories
put forth to justify the use of "no-fault" principles in accident com-
pensation.2 The argument is that in terms of fairness, the defendant
is generally the more efficient risk bearer because he can distribute
those losses among those community members who benefit from
the dangerous activity."
Upon consideration of these principles, public transportation
industries are obvious examples. In order to protect these industries
so that they will be able to afford to compensate victims on a no-
fault basis, however, it is necessary to limit the extent of their lia-
bility in most cases. Thus, insofar as it concerns international pas-
senger transportation, absolute liability must be limited liability.
The inclusion of the absolute liability provision in the Montreal
Agreement" and later in the Guatemala City Protocol can generally
be seen as a recognition of this principle."
Professor Robert Keeton2 has observed that, in general, tort law
should not initiate a movement in a direction that is offensive to
the public's moral standards." The Montreal Agreement did not
20 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 569 (1948). Cf. Orr, supra note 19, at 404.
21 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 494-95 (4th
ed. 1971).
22 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 501 (1961). See also Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. Rnv. 497, 559 (1967).
2 Keeton, supra note 18, at 405.
24 For discussion on the introduction of absolute liability as a replacement for
common law fault concepts, see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at
588, 589 and basic airline resistance to the introduction of the concept at 595.
Subject to what is discussed infra concerning absolute liability and its pur-
pose.
2 Langdell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2 7 Keeton, supra note 17 at 422. In speaking of Workman's Compensation
laws he noted that scheduled compensation became generally acceptable because
it was believed the employer had the capacity and primary responsibility for de-
veloping safe working conditions and a duty of compensation where safety pre-
cautions became ineffective. Without this kind of compensation few workers
could have overcome the hurdles of assumption of risks, contributory negligence,
and fellow servant doctrines. Contrast this idea to that of the passenger vis-a-vis
an international carrier, bearing in mind the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 522. "Clearly by the time of the
.1960's, the Warsaw shift in the burden of proof-important as it was in 1930-no
longer provided any substantial benefit to passengers that would be unavailable
without the Convention."
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need public endorsement to become effective, yet viewed from the
community's perspective, the absolute limitation of liability to seven-
ty-five thousand dollars was an improvement upon what had existed
under the Warsaw system. Significantly, however, the Montreal
Agreement maintained the wilful misconduct provision of the War-
saw Convention.
Paramount in any "no-fault" compensation scheme is the quick
recovery of compensation for damages sustained. There is a certain
quid pro quo in that the victim accepts reasonable compensation
without a need to establish fault. Because of this lack of focus on
fault, the quid pro quo analysis fails where the conduct involved
amounts to intentional conduct. The leap from a system premised
upon the concern for compensating the victim by eliminating fault
in lieu of an absolute limited recovery, to be a compensation system
which establishes absolute limited liability in all cases even where
the blameworthy conduct is performed intentionally, wantonly or
in reckless disregard for the consequences is morally indefensible.
The victim is not completely compensated for the damages result-
ing from conduct which is tantamount to intentional conduct, and
the wrongdoer enjoys the protection of limited liability exposure
regardless of the nature of his conduct. Although the concept of
strict liability coincided with public moral standards by subjecting
those engaged in ultrahazardous and inherently dangerous activities
to complete and absolute liability, protection of the wrongdoer by
limiting his liability for intentionally wrongful or wantonly reckless
acts should be rejected as contrary to public moral standards.
3. Deleting the Wilful Misconduct Provision
At the Montreal Conference in 19668 and again in 19699 the
United States delegation was unsuccessful in concluding an agree-
ment among the delegates that one hundred thousand dollars was
a reasonable limit of liability for passenger compensation. That
21 Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Con-
vention and Hague Protocol, ICAO Doc. No. 8584-LC/154-1 at 112 (1966).29 ICAO Subcommittee of the Legal Committee on the Question of Revision
of the Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol, Montreal, 1969,
ICAO Doc. No. 8839-LC/158-1. This subcommittee was formed as a result of
a recommendation by the ICAO Legal Committee in September 1967, to give top
priority to the item of possible revision of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 as
amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955.
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limitation was the priority item for the United States delegation; it
was thought that any amount below that limit would clearly stand
no chance of Senate approval. Consequently, a compromise plan
known as the "New Zealand Package"30 offered a realistic chance
of concluding a widely accepted treaty. 1 This plan supported the
one hundred thousand dollar recovery limit and made the carrier
absolutely liable to that amount for passenger damages; however,
it proposed that, except for the contributory negligence defense,
the limit be unbreakable in all circumstances. Many nations agreed
unbreakability was an essential condition for acceptance of the
one hundred thousand dollar limit.' The New Zealand delegate
offering the plan even noted that unbreakability was the "sugar
that coated the rather bitter pill of the high figure."' Consequently,
a strong majority of represented nations was successful in elimin-
ating the provisions which would have allowed passenger recovery
to exceed the maximum limit. This motion, which effectively elim-
inated any further discussion of exceeding the limit, passed by a
vote of forty-three for, none against, and four abstaining.' Although
some nations registered their basic disapproval of this action, they
agreed not to oppose it in the spirit of compromise.' Many mem-
bers considered it inevitable that the limit should be breakable in
order to accommodate the doctrine of dol,3' while the Italian dele-
gate attacked the plan as not legally realistic."
30 ICAO Legal Committee, Seventeenth Session, Montreal, 1970, ICAO Doc.
No. 8878-LC/162 at 145-49. The plan provided inter alia absolute liability for
passenger injury or death to a $100,000 limit without possibility of exceeding this
limit. These changes were incorporated into what is basically now the Guatemala
City Protocol. Thus it is a compromise measure of the $100,000 figure without
a wilful misconduct right to break the limit.
1 Id. at 148. The vote for an unbreakable absolute liability to a limit of
$100,000 was 25 for and 6 against, with Italy, France, Malagasay and Congo
abstaining.
81 For example, ICAO International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City,
1971, 13th Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, ICAO Doc. No. 9040-
LC/167-1 at 140, 141. [Hereinafter referred to as the Guatemala City Proceed-
ings.]
31 ICAO Legal Committee, supra note 30, at 152.
4Id. at 143.
"Id. Minutes of the Third Meeting, at 59. The French delegate had reserva-
tions about eliminating Article 25 and believed that absolute liability was not
progressive and could not be effective, but decided, in order to achieve agree-
ment, to consider the concept if certain defenses were reserved to the carrier.
36 ICAO Subcommittee of the Legal Committee, supra note 29, at 4.
17 Id. at 274-75. Dr. Bacalli of Italy, in drawing an analogy to maritime law,
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Arguments in support of the unbreakability idea were primarily
urged by the smaller, less developed countries and can be summar-
ized as follows:
a) Multiple limits would lead to lack of uniformity in compensation.
b) Higher limits or situations of unlimited liability would mean higher
fares for all passengers.
c) Only those passengers from the more affluent countries possess
the expectation of a recovery in terms of the high limits.
d) Double and triple existing insurance costs would be imposed upon
the small "infant" airlines, thus making it impossible for them
to advance economically.
e) There would be no expectation of receiving swift compensation
for passenger injuries or deaths."8
These arguments were persuasive enough that the majority present
voted to eliminate the wilful misconduct provision. The IATA
observer to the Conference noted that the most significant point
was that breakability of the Convention limit had a direct connec-
tion with the cost of insurance, stating that there was approximately
forty million dollars a year difference between a breakable one
hundred thousand dollar limit and the unbreakable plan."
4. The Insurance Issue
Many international carriers have enjoyed what may be an arti-
ficially low insurance cost for passenger liability because of the
limits of recovery established by the Warsaw/Hague Conventions.
Until the advent of the Montreal Agreement there was no available
criteria to determine the extent to which insurance costs would in-
crease if liability limits were raised. The Montreal Agreement af-
fected only those carriers operating to and from the United States,
and the main economic effect fell upon the United States interna-
tional airlines. The Air Transportation Committee' statistics at the
1969 International Civil Aviation Organization Legal Subcom-
mittee Meeting showed the increase in passenger liability premiums
that different airlines experienced as a result of the Montreal Agree-
noted that no court ever allowed a carrier to benefit from any wilful misconduct
or personal gross negligence or even the carrier's failure to exercise proper su-
pervision.
08 ICAO Legal Committee, supra note 30, at 77.
I91d. at 153.40ICAO Subcommittee of the Legal Committee, supra note 29, at 43.
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ment and the relative percentage of those premiums to the airlines'
overall operating costs."' After the Montreal Agreement insurance
premiums, for the most part, were only one per cent or less of the
airlines' total operating cost.
At the Montreal Conference in 1966, the United States delega-
tion submitted Civil Aeronautics Board estimates to the effect that
airline costs would increase thirty-two cents per thousand revenue
passenger miles if the one hundred thousand dollar passenger lia-
bility limit replaced the Warsaw/Hague limit; the difference be-
tween the two limits would be six cents per thousand revenue pas-
senger miles.' These figures contemplated systems where the
passenger liability limit could be broken upon proof of the carrier's
wilful misconduct. It has been suggested that if there is no possi-
bility of exceeding the Convention limit for passenger liability most
major airlines will eliminate all passenger liability insurance."
Arguments were raised at the Conferences" that insurance costs
for the operation of small regional airlines would be proportionately
heavier in comparison to the larger well established airlines; there-
fore, any substantial increase in the liability limits would be unfair
to the smaller carriers and financially undesirable. The Jamaican
delegate, whose view was shared by many, submitted that these air-
lines would be bearing extra insurance expenses so that the wealthy
passengers of other countries could take advantage of the higher
limits.' This argument has been criticized as an incorrect appraisal
of the estimated risk a small regional air carrier would encounter.
In those particular cases when the regional airline regularly flew
routes where the potential liability was high, for instance from
41 Id. at 45.
"Special ICAO Meeting on Limits, supra note 28, at 29.
"Kennelly, supra note 8, at 350:
If a major airline knows that its liability is an unbreakable maxi-
mum of $100,000 per passenger regardless of its degree of fault,
what need is there for insurance? Insurance, traditionally and prac-
tically, is designed to insure risks. But there will be no risks.
Thus, if the proposed treaty is adopted, there appears to be little
question but that excess or reinsurance companies will be immedi-
ately eliminated for all practical purposes from the insurance mar-
ket, insofar as airlines are concerned ....
"Special ICAO Meeting on Limits, supra note 28; ICAO Subcommittee of
the Legal Committee, supra note 29; ICAO Legal Committee, supra note 30;
Guatemala City Proceedings, supra note 32, at 15.
"Special ICAO Meeting on Limits, supra note 28, at 7.
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Jamaica to Miami, the costs could be effectively passed on to the
higher income travellers through fare agreement."' When the United
States withdrawal from the Warsaw system was anticipated, esti-
mates showed that little if any change would be reflected in the
insurance costs for the "infant industries" even though they could
be subjected to unlimited liability under certain circumstances."
The IUAI' observer at the 1966 Montreal Conference thought
that legal liability coverage was a relatively small proportion of
the overall operating costs of an airline and that too much import-
ance might have been attached to the aspect of insurance costs."'
Liability insurance costs for an airline depend upon an estimated
risk of accident in combination with an estimated average com-
pensation to be paid to those affected by accidents. Risks are cal-
culated on the basis of past air safety records, taking into considera-
tion such variables as climate, technical standards of the equip-
ment and facilities being used by the airline." Statistics show that
airline safety continues to improve."
Insurance costs remain a relatively small operating expense for
the majority of airlines. Some reports indicate that a large per-
centage of the airlines' operating expenses are spent on such items
as advertising and passenger comfort." If due consideration is given
to the risk/safety factor in regard to the utilization of their services
by those who could demand large compensation awards, the impact
of increased insurance premiums for the "infant airlines" of de-
veloping countries may not be as expensive as once feared.'"
The damage award of one and one-half million dollars in Kween
41 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 565-66.
47 Special ICAO Meeting on Limits, supra note 28, at 142.
4
8 ld. at 140.
4 Special ICAO Meeting on Limits, supra note 28, at 140.
5' ICAO Legal Committee, Seventeenth Session, supra note 30, at 50.
"1 Special ICAO Meeting on Limits, supra note 28, at 53.
32 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 567:
Allowing for a reasonable margin of error in what were conceded
to be only estimates of the incremental insurance costs at various
limits taken as a proportion of operating cost, were clearly some-
where between the cost of the olive and the cost of the gin in the
martini, and nowhere near the cost of an inflight movie.
5 See, e.g., the comment of Tunisian delegate, ICAO Legal Committee, supra
note 30, at 78.
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v. McDonnell Douglas" shows, insofar as this accident is con-
cerned, that the risk underwriter is ultimately paying, regardless of
the carrier's limited liability position. Consequently, insurance
groups who write air liability and risk insurance may now desire to
rethink completely the question of airline insurance in the context
of spreading the risk of liability throughout the industry."
B. PUTTING WILFUL MISCONDUCT BACK INTO THE CONVENTION
1. Ordinary Jurisdictional and Conflict Rules
One of the purposes of a convention that unifies rules governing
international air travel is to facilitate the processing of legal claims
arising from passenger carriage, baggage, and cargo in order to
promote a fast and simple accident compensation system for in-
jured victims."6 The alternative would be to resort to ordinary con-
flict of laws principles for the settlement of even the most insig-
nificant claims. This could entail protracted proceedings to de-
termine the lex fori, what choice of law rules to use and whether
the lex loci delecti principle is valid in a given case. This could pose
tremendous problems when one considers that several national
systems of law conceivably could affect each phase of the liti-
gation.'
Jury verdict, U.S. District Court Los Angeles, California, February 27, 1976.
The dilemma for the insurance companies may be resolved in various ways
of pooling risks and that in itself may become the subject of some kind of inter-
national agreement. When the same risk is insured several times over by policies
for air carriers, manufacturers, air traffic controllers, component parts manufac-
turers independent contractors and freight forwarders, one may legitimately ask
why some of those who participate in this same process should have their liability
limited to the detriment of other segments of the industry that bear the risk of
incurring verdicts of potential unlimited liability. If the Kween decision is a
viable standard of potential liability, the argument becomes more poignant than
ever. Thus, consideration could be given to the establishment of an international
compensation award fund and all references in the convention to the amount of
recovery for damage would refer to this fund; all other matters would be regu-
lated by the convention. It appears that the expense for the airline would be pro-
hibitive as it would have to make the major insurance contribution (at least where
the fund would purport to compensate the claimants in full) unless studies con-
ducted showed otherwise. See also Tompkins, Limitation of Liability By Treaty
and Statute, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 421 (1970).
" Special ICAO Meeting on Limits, supra note 28, Opening Address of
Temporary Chairman at 2.
"7For general discussion of conflict of laws problems if the United States
withdrew from the Warsaw system see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note
22, at 526-32 & 575-86.
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Hypothetically, assume no convention governed international
air carriage of passengers, and that after a United States citizen
concluded business in London, he had to go to Paris and then to
Oran, Algeria, before returning to New York. He made his travel
arrangements through Air France, and was issued a ticket: London
to Paris via Air France; Paris to Oran via Air Algeria; and then
Oran to Paris and Paris to New York via Air France. While board-
ing the stair ramp of the Air France plane at Oran airport, he was
seriously and permanently injured when a firearm was discharged
by a person who had not been checked by Air France security.
The security employees claimed that the Algeria Port Authority had
all security measures at the airport concerning passenger checks.
Let us further assume that there was a specific Air France regula-
tion that its personnel were to independently screen all passengers
boarding its flights.
Conceivably four countries would have some interest in the liti-
gation. A United States citizen incurred serious injuries; the con-
tract of carriage was made in the United Kingdom; the carrier with
whom the transaction was made and on whose ramp the injuries
were sustained was French; and the place where the accident
occurred was under the care and responsiiblity of Algerian
authorities.
Applying traditional jurisdictional and conflict of laws principles,
it would appear that the United States plaintiff would be able to
bring suit in the United States against Air France but not against
any Algerian defendant. Even if suit were brought in the United
States, it is doubtful whether its domestic law would be invoked on
the question of damages." The court might exercise its discretion
" Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934) states: 'The law of the
place of the wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury."
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961), applied the law of the place of injury (Massachusetts) but signi-
ficantly, refused on public policy grounds to enforce its limitations provisions as
to damages. Courts continued to disregard the language of the Restatement, but
drew away from the much criticized language of "public policy reasons" and
instead used "significant contacts" and "significant relationship." See Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See also
Carvers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese, Comments on Babcock
v. Jackson: A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212,
1240 (1963), where Prof. Currie says "It will be quite impossible to draw a uni-
versal rule for choice of law designed to accommodate the Kilberg case, so inter-
preted" [based upon the most significant contacts]. Griffith v. United Air Lines,
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and decline to hear the action, invoking the doctrine of forum non
conveniens." Thus the plaintiff would be subject to either French
or Algerian domestic law on the question of the degree of negli-
gence, limitations on recovery, if any, and the amount of recover-
able damages."
Under the Warsaw system, this situation would be covered by
the Convention, and suit against Air France could be brought in
the United States. 1 Under the proposed Guatemala City Protocol,
the Protocol would control the forum, but the plaintiff's damage
recovery would be limited, and could not exceed that limit even
though wilful misconduct could be shown against the carrier.
2. Considered Alternatives
Until a plan gains the two-thirds majority approval of the United
States Senate, as well as the endorsement of a large majority of
other nations concerned with international air transportation, there
will not be a single treaty governing international air travel.
The ideal solution would be for injured plaintiffs to receive com-
plete compensation to the extent of their damages promptly and
without the necessity of prolonged court action." The "fair" solu-
tion is to have an international convention which leaves the de-
Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), declined to apply Colorado's limitation of
damages holding the place of the accident was "purely fortuitous." Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953), first applied the location of the most sig-
nificant contacts, to the place of injury. Similarly English courts have adopted
basically the same rule. See Boys v. Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356: Lord Denning's
opinion in the Court of Appeal, [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, 20, " ... the law of the country
with which the parties and the act done have the most significant connection."
In the House of Lords decision, though affirming, was reluctant to liberalize the
old rule completely and adopt a theory based solely on a "contact" or "center"
of "gravity" theory. See [1971] A.C. 356, 391. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (P.O.D. II, 1968). Tramontana v. S.A. Empressa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grande, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 943 (1966) holding Brazilian limits on wrongful death of U.S. sailor ap-
plied. Despite the scholastic appeal of Professor Currie's "interest analysis," the
theory still lacks wide acceptance.
5 In deciding, the court would have to consider the plaintiff's chances of ob-
taining an adequate remedy elsewhere among the obvious convenience and evi-
dentiary factors.
60R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 224 (1971).
One common method to avoid the application of the law of the place of the
wrong in personal injury cases is to switch the label of the problem from "tort'
to "contract."
01 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1(3), 17, 28(1).
62 Kennelly, International Symposium, supra note 8, at 99.
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termination of liability to the domestic court of the plaintiff's domi-
cile.' Some United States opponents of the Guatemala City
Protocol have pressed for a similar solution, suggesting that the
Protocol would be acceptable if it simply deleted all references to
limitation of liability and allowed each state to establish its own
limits."' The basic flaw in this suggestion is that it affords absolutely
no protection to the small airline which could experience an irre-
parable financial setback by a single incident or be subjected to
such insurance expenses to make profitable operations impossible.
In addition, no country would become a party to an agreement
which would subject its domestic carriers to claims of unlimited
liability merely because a convention established jurisdiction in
another state; rather they would prefer a system where the tradi-
tional jurisdictional and Conflict of laws principles apply." A state
would gain no significant benefit by submitting to a system which
modified traditional choice of laws rules to the extent that another
country's domestic law and legal theories could conceivably con-
trol over incidents occurring outside its territory and involving
foreign corporations. Any regulatory uniformity that the conven-
tion might otherwise provide would not outweigh the uncertainty
produced by unlimited liability and unpredictable forums.
Dr. Werner Guldimann, chairman of the legal committee at the
1969 Montreal Subcommittee Conference, suggested a plan where-
by suit could be brought in the plaintiff's domicile if the carrier's
operation were also to that state." He noted that such a plan took
into account the differences between states' living standards, ex-
posed the carrier to suits in other jurisdictions to the extent of its
geographical ambit of operation, and could be incorporated into
the Warsaw system with little change by giving each state the
11ICAO Subcommittee of the Legal Committee, supra note 29, at 131. See
also Mendelsohn, Symposium on Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 624
(1967).
'4 See note 8 supra.
"States traditionally are very protective of their sovereignty rights and are
reluctant to give them up where they will not benefit from the arrangement.
16 "A Multiple Limit System Based Partly on Domicile," ICAO Subcommittee
of the Legal Committee, supra note 29, at 151. He noted that a system based
purely on the plaintiff's domicile was very difficult to reconcile with the legitimate
interests of the carrier who would have to take into consideration very high
limits not connected in any way with the geographical boundaries of its operations.
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option of choosing a limitation of liability."7 The plan had certain
disadvantages in that very complex insurance and legal situations
could develop; it would discriminate between passengers aboard
the same aircraft as well as promote competitive discrimination
between carriers which operate to countries with high limits and
those that do not. Indeed, Dr. Guldiman felt that such a plan would
not be generally acceptable to other states. 8
3. A Possible Alternative
The following is an example of incorporation of the wilful mis-
conduct provision into a convention to afford passenger protection
against conduct which is significantly more culpable than mere
negligence, yet not offend basic principles of uniformity:
a) Insert the wilful misconduct provision into the convention
only as a new section to be elected in lieu of absolute carrier lia-
bility. The election would be made by a declaration to proceed on
traditional fault concepts under domestic law.
b) If the plaintiff chose to sue on straight fault theory and did
not prove wilful misconduct, the total judgment, if any, could not
exceed the convention limit plus the amount a supplement fund
may contribute.
c) The carrier would have the right to show the proportion of
his fault to the damages sustained by way of defense and by joining
third parties into the action. The jury or court would make its find-
ings in terms of percentages of fault for which each defendant (or
to what extent the carrier, if sole defendant) is responsible." Con-
tributory negligence would be treated according to the domestic
law of the member states.
d) Each contracting member of the convention would be free
to establish a maximum limit, if any, for recovery beyond the con-
vention limit for wilful misconduct verdicts.
67 Id.
6 I d. at 152. See also the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Pas-
sengers & Luggage by Sea, Art. 7(2) (1974), 14 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS 945
(July, 1975).
"See Dole v. Dow Chemical, 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972), where New York State has adopted the practice of the trier of fact
apportioning between defendants their contribution to the entire accident. Thus
each owes the total amount of recovery to the plaintiff, but as between themselves
their damages are determined by the degree of their fault.
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e) Strict jurisdictional rules would apply to the election to pro-
ceed on a wilful misconduct claim. Suit could be brought in the
domicile of the plaintiff if the carrier possesses an establishment for
the purpose of transacting business in that state. Otherwise the suit
will be in the carrier's principal place of business.
A similar system has been in effect for those carriers operating to
the United States"0 since the adoption of the Montreal Agreement.
The effect on carriers' insurance rates, as under the Montreal
Agreement, would depend upon the extent of airline service to
countries which established high limits of recovery for wilful mis-
conduct. There are several advantages to such a plan. In most
cases the smaller developing airlines would be protected to the limit
fixed by their domestic legislation; that limit could only be exceeded
in cases involving a wilful misconduct verdict, in a country having
a higher limit (provided the plaintiff is domiciled there and the
carrier has an establishment for the purposes of transacting busi-
ness). Small regional airlines which seldom fly the commercially
expensive and more heavily travelled routes would not be sub-
stantially affected by this alternative.
The possibility of the plan's acceptance by a large number of
nations would be enhanced; a wilful misconduct provision would
conform more closely to national jurisprudence7' and society's
moral standards."2 Whether to define specifically the term wilful
misconduct would be open for negotiation at any international con-
ference." Carriers would be inclined to be more safety conscious
"See ICAO Doc. No. 8839-LC/1581-1 at 153-54 (1969).
"Keeton, supra note 17 and note 27. Also note that the domestic law of coun-
tries such as the Soviet Union base their civil code almost exclusively on fault
principles as discussed in Johnson, No Liability Without Fault, The Soviet View,
20 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 165 (1967). A Japanese delegate expressed the
opinion that deletion of wilful misconduct would conflict with Japanese law. Sub-
committee on the Legal Committee, supra note 29, at 176, 195.
" See, e.g., language in Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1953):
To uphold the carrier's contention that the limitation of liability is
absolute, regardless of a fundamental breach which goes to the
very essence of its undertaking, would permit any carrier with reck-
lessness to violate the terms of the bill of lading, knowing that it
cannot be called upon to pay more than $500 per package. Such a
policy, if upheld, would immunize the carrier against the conse-
quences of its own wilful actions at the expense of an innocent
party.
73 Compare the following interpretations of wilful misconduct: Article 13,
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in their procedures and personnel policies to protect against wil-
ful misconduct claims. This would benefit the industry and the
travelling public."'
The plaintiff would not generally sue on a theory of wilful mis-
conduct because he would not want to risk the sure recovery of the
convention plus whatever may be available from the supplement
fund in exchange for a trial wherein he would have the burden of
proof on fault principles. Plaintiff would not take this risk unless
he had sound reasons for the election.
In order to protect the manufacturers and others from suits being
financed by way of settlements with the carrier and the adminis-
trator of the supplement fund, a release amounting to a right of
subrogation should be passed on to the carrier and administrator
as a condition of settlement.' If this were required, it could be
argued that the plaintiff would always sue the carrier and join any
third parties that he could, thus defeating one of the principal ob-
jectives of the convention-reduced litigation. This would only
occur where a supplemental fund provision existed, however. It
should be noted that absent a verdict of wilful misconduct, the
plaintiff could never recover more from the carrier than the con-
vention limit as supplemented. In all cases where the issue of wil-
supra note 12; KLM v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 921 (1961):
the intentional performance of an act with knowledge that the
act will probably result in injury or damage or in some manner
as to imply reckless disregard of the consequences of its perform-
ance, and likewise, it also means failure to act in such circum-
stances . . . as a deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty
necessary to safety.
See also McCoy, supra note 7, at 740: "Wilful misconduct has been defined as
negligent misconduct so gross as to amount to either a reckless or intentional
tort and is compatible with essential notions of substantial justice." See also
Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 951 (1951); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines Ltd., 346
F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965); Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corp., [1952] 2
All E.R. 1016, 1019 (Q.B.).
4 See United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1976,
at 1, col. 8 and p. 53 col. 7. First criminal indictment of an airline as a result of
a crash at Boston's Logan Airport, Nov. 3, 1973, Pan American pled no contest
to a charge of criminal negligence.
I See Comment on Guatemala City Protocol to the Warsaw Convention and
Supplemental Plan Under Article 35-A, 5 N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L LAw & POLITICS
313, 335 (1973). "Without the possibility of recovery [via subrogation rights]
against the manufacturers and other parties, the administrator would undoubtedly
have to substantially raise the level of the charges."
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ful misconduct is not to be submitted to a jury" the carrier could
either admit liability to the convention limit or try to mitigate his
proportion of fault, hopefully coming well under the convention
limit. This not only would be potentially advantageous to the car-
rier, but it would provide a fairer framework under which suits of
this type would be brought.
In our example of the United States businessman receiving seri-
ous injuries in Oran, Algeria, suit against Air France could be
established in the United States. The plaintiff could choose either
to accept the convention limits, as supplemented, as compensation
for his damages, or proceed on a fault basis and try to establish
wilful misconduct. If the election against the convention limit were
made, Air France would try to prove 1) it did not commit a wilful
misconduct violation, 2) that it is not at fault at all, 3) and if it
were at fault, its proportion of blame is small since the larger de-
gree of fault should be attributed to the Algerian authorities.
CONCLUSION
The weakness of this suggestion from the standpoint of the inter-
national community is that it does not provide for a uniform, clear,
and simple system for all nations conducive to the expeditious set-
tlement of claims. It does not discourage litigation or the possibility
of litigation. Nor does it protect the carrier from the possibility
of unlimited liability. Manufacturers and other possible third par-
ties would argue that juries would tend to decide the issues against
them more often in an attempt to justly compensate the plaintiff;
their liability could be limited while the carriers' would always be
limited. On the other hand, when the carrier is totally at fault, but
without wilful misconduct, the plaintiff's damage award could be
limited to an amount substantially below that which he might other-
wise expect to receive.
It is doubtful that these competing interests will ever be fully
satisfied. The alternative discussed herein, however, has a better
7' For instance the introduction in federal courts of the multi-district panel
method of dealing with suits from common disasters. Under federal statute all
the cases are combined for pre-trial discovery and liability considerations under
supervision of one federal court. See McCoy, supra note 7, at 760.
' The Kween verdict, supra note 54 graphically illustrates the point.
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chance of gaining wide acceptance than a plan of absolute liability
limitation. From a safety standpoint, it will afford the international
traveller greater protection because carriers will endeavor to adopt
policies that discourage or minimize the occurrence of wilful mis-
conduct." Society will not be able to charge that the carrier is
protected by a limit of liability regardless of some fundamental
breach of his obligation, or vindicated to the extent of its limitation,
for the consequences of its wilful actions against innocent parties.
A United States' Senator might be very wary to give his approval
to a convention that makes it impossible for his constituents to
recover more than a fixed amount of money regardless of the cir-
cumstances producing injury or death."
A forty million dollar price tag for an entire industry is certainly
a small insurance price to pay for the protection afforded, not to
mention the benefit that could be achieved-a widely accepted
treaty. The question of insurance costs has been unduly relied
upon to defeat measures that would provide increased compensa-
tion to accident victims. Under the plan described, for instance,
small developing airlines would be protected and able to assume
increasing risks consistent with their growth. Uniformity to a sig-
nificant degree would be accomplished. The fear of prolonged
vexatious litigation would be greatly alleviated, resulting only if
the plaintiff elected to disregard a guaranteed recovery.
The main objective is a single plan, acceptable to the large ma-
jority of nations. For such a plan to exist, every interest cannot be
fully represented; however, this is not to say that the fundamental
interests of the majority of nations and international travellers can-
not be adequately represented." The plan here presented offers a
13 United States v. Pan Am., supra note 74. FAA survey found that a random
check showed that in nine out of ten cases, federal regulations were not complied
with. In 1974 officials reported 260 known violations.
19id. The liability limitation of the Guatemala City Protocol would apply
even in cases of criminal negligence, as in this case, or in cases involving passen-
ger injury and death.
10 But the all-or-nothing approach of true believers rarely supplies a
workable formula for a workaday world. When the desirable aim
of upholding the stability of the international structure collides
with the laudable end of placing some domestic checks and bal-
ances upon the making of international commitments, the reason-
able solution should be a compromise that protects both sets of in-
terests to the maximum extent.
1976]
622 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [42
practical and reasonable resolution of the competing interests in-
volved in this complex issue.
Kearney, International Limitations on External Commitments Article 46 of the
Treaties Convention, 4 INT'L LAW. 1 (1969).
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